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Abstract
This paper examines the informational eﬃciency of loans relative to bonds sur-
rounding loan default dates and bond default dates. We examine this issue using a
unique dataset of daily secondary market prices of loans over the 11/1999-06/2002 pe-
riod. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with a monitoring role of loans. First, consistent with
a view that the monitoring role of loans should be reﬂected in more precise expectations
embedded in loan prices, we ﬁnd that the price reaction of loans is less adverse than
that of bonds around loan and bond default dates. Second, we ﬁnd evidence that the
diﬀerence in price reaction of loans versus bonds is ampliﬁed around loan default dates
that are not preceded by a bond default date of the same company. Finally, we ﬁnd
a higher recovery rate for loans as compared to bonds, suggesting that the monitoring
role of loans does not diminish signiﬁcantly in the post default period. Our results are
robust to controlling for security-speciﬁc characteristics, such as seniority, and collat-
eral, and for multiple measures of cumulative abnormal returns around default dates.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the loan market is informationally more eﬃcient than the bond
market around default dates.
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1. Introduction
The monitoring role of bank lending has been well documented in the literature. Several
theoretical models highlight the unique monitoring function of banks (see for example, Dia-
mond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Fama, 1985). These studies generally argue
that banks have a comparative cost advantage in monitoring loan agreements. For example,
Fama (1985) argues that banks, as insiders, have superior information due to their access
to inside information whereas outside (public) debt holders must rely mostly on publicly
available information. Diamond (1984) contends that banks have scale economies and com-
parative cost advantages in information production that enable them to undertake superior
debt-related monitoring.1
It may be noted that the incentives to monitor are likely to be preserved even when a
loan is sold in the secondary market. First, a loan buyer may have an implicit recourse to
the bank selling the loan. Gorton and Pennacchi (1989) document evidence consistent with
the presence of implicit guarantees to loan buyers to sell the loans back to the selling bank
if the underlying borrower performs worse than anticipated. Second, the lead bank, which
typically holds the largest share of a syndicated loan (see Kroszner and Strahan (2001) for
details) rarely sells its share of a loan. Third, not all participants in a loan syndicate sell
their share of a loan, and therefore continue to have incentives to monitor. Finally, the
changing role of banks, from loan originators to loan dealers and traders, which facilitated
the development of a secondary market for loans (See Taylor and Yang (2003)), may provide
additional channels of monitoring. For example, a bank who serves as a loan dealer will have
incentives to monitor loans that are in its inventory. Consequently, the monitoring role of
loans has important implications for the informational eﬃciency of the loan market versus
1Several empirical studies also provide evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans. These studies examine
the issue of whether bank lenders provide valuable information about borrowers. For example, James (1987)
and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) document that the announcement of a bank credit agreement conveys
positive news to the stock market about the borrowing ﬁrm’s credit worthiness. Extending James’ work,
Lummer and McConnell (1989), show that only ﬁrms renewing a bank credit agreement have a signiﬁcantly
positive announcement period stock excess return. More recently, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2003)
document a signiﬁcant negative announcement return for the lead lending bank when a major corporate
borrower announces default or bankruptcy.
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the bond market. That is, as skilled loan monitors − so called delegated monitors, banks
collect information on a frequent basis, and should be able to reﬂect such information in
the secondary market loan prices in a timely manner. Hence, the surprise or unexpected
component of a loan default or a bond default is likely to be smaller for banks than for
bond investors because banks are continuous monitors as compared to investors in the bond
markets where monitoring tends to be more diﬀuse and subject to free rider problems.
The informational eﬃciency of the bond market relative to the stock market has received
increasing attention. For example, using a dataset based on daily and hourly transactions
for 55 high-yield bonds on the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) electronic
ﬁxed income pricing system (FIPS) between January 3, 1995 and October 1, 1995, Hotchkiss
and Ronen (2002) ﬁnd that the informational eﬃciency of corporate bond prices is similar to
that of the underlying stocks. Speciﬁcally, they document that the information in earnings
news is quickly incorporated into both bond and stock prices, even on an intraday level.
Other studies have found a strong contemporaneous relationship between corporate bond
returns and stock returns.2
There is also a growing literature that indirectly contributes to the informational ef-
ﬁciency debate by examining institutional bond trading costs, trading volumes, and the
dynamics of price formation. Using a large dataset of corporate bond trades of institutional
investors from 1995 to 1997, Schultz (2001) documents that the average round-trip trading
costs of investment grade bonds is $0.27 per $100 of par value. Schultz also ﬁnds that large
trades cost less, large dealers charge less than small dealers, and active institutions pay less
than inactive institutions. Interestingly, Schultz ﬁnds that bond ratings have little eﬀect on
trading costs.3Alexander et al (2000) use the NASD FIPS data to study the determinants
of bond trading volume. They cite anecdotal evidence that bonds initially trade often but
2See, Blume et al. (1991), Cornell and Green (1991), and Kwan (1996) for details.
3Two other studies also examine bond trading costs. Hong andWarga (2000) employ a sample of 1,973 buy
and sell trades for the same bond on the same day and estimate an eﬀective spread of $0.13 for investment-
grade bonds and $0.19 for non-investment grade bonds per $100 par value. Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999),
using a methodology similar to Hong and Warga (2000) ﬁnd that trading costs, on the basis of $100 par
value, are highest for municipal bonds (mean spread of $0.22), followed by corporate bonds ($0.21), and
treasury bonds ($0.11).
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that trading declines as the bonds fall into the hands of institutions who hold them to ma-
turity. Saunders, Srinivasan, and Walter (2002) analyze the dynamics of price formation in
the corporate bond market. They study the bids (and oﬀers) received by one anonymous
asset manager who solicited oﬀers to buy or sell from bond dealers on behalf of institutional
clients from January to November 1997. Typically, these quotes were received within two
minutes of a request for a price. The authors ﬁnd that about 70 percent of the time, more
than one bid (or oﬀer) was received, and on average, for investment grade bonds, the winning
bid price was 12.0 basis points better than the second best price and 20.5 basis points better
than the average price.
However, there is no study to date that examines the pricing eﬃciency of the (secondary)
market for loans nor on the informational eﬃciency of the market for loans relative to the
market for bonds of the same corporation, largely due to unavailability (at least until now)
of secondary market prices of loans. The market for loans includes two broad categories, the
ﬁrst is the primary or syndicated loan market, in which portions of a loan are placed with
a number of banks, often in conjunction with, and as part of, the loan origination process
(usually referred to as the sale of participations). The second category is the seasoned or
secondary loan sales market in which a bank subsequently sells an existing loan (or part
of a loan). In addition, the secondary loan sales market is sometimes segmented based on
the type of investors involved on the “buy-side”, e.g., institutional loan market versus retail
loan market. A ﬁnal way of stratifying loan trades in the secondary market is to distinguish
between the “par” loans (loans selling at 90% or more of face value) versus “distressed”
loans (loans selling at below 90% of face value). Figure 1 shows the rate of growth in the
secondary market for loans, stratiﬁed by this last categorization from 1991-2002. Note the
growth in the market upto 2000 when the level of secondary loan transactions topped $100
billion for the ﬁrst time. Note also the increasing proportion of distressed loan sales reached
42% in 2002.
Our study focuses on the informational eﬃciency of the loan market relative to the bond
market around default dates, using a unique dataset of secondary market daily prices of
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loans. Our sample period covers more than two years, namely November 1, 1999 through
June 30, 2002, a time of increasing level of corporate defaults.4
We hypothesize and test the following implications of a monitoring role of loans: First,
loans are likely to have timely and superior expectations built into their prices because banks
are continuous monitors as compared to investors in the bond markets where monitoring
tends to be more diﬀuse and subject to free rider problems. This implies the unexpected
(or surprise) component of a default event is likely to be lower for loans than for bonds.
Consequently, one would expect the price reaction of loans to be signiﬁcantly lower than the
price reaction of bonds around both loan and bond default dates. Second, to the extent that
the monitoring advantage of loans over bonds is likely to continue post-default, one would
expect a higher recovery rate for loans as compared to that of bonds, controlling for diﬀerent
attributes, such as, size, maturity, and seniority of both instruments.
Speciﬁcally, we pursue the following objectives: First, we examine return and price cor-
relations of loans and bonds around loan and bond default dates. Second, we empirically
test hypotheses on the return performance and recovery rates of loans versus bonds around
loan and bond default dates as outlined above. Finally, to benchmark our results, we extend
our analysis to the return performance of loans versus stocks. To the best of our knowledge,
ours is the ﬁrst study to examine these issues using secondary market loan price data.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: First, while a positive correlation
exists between daily bond returns and loan returns, it is relatively low. However, the return
correlation is considerably higher during a 21 day event window [-10,+10], day 0 being the
default date, as compared to other times in our sample. This ﬁnding reﬂects the increasing
importance of default risk premiums in explaining loan and bond returns as compared to
other factors5 as we approach a default date. The price correlations are signiﬁcantly higher
4According to Standard & Poors, corporate defaults set a record in 2002, for the fourth consecutive year.
The 234 companies and $178 billion of debt that defaulted during 2002 was the largest number and amount
ever, exceeding the previous records of 220 companies and $119 billion in 2001. In 2000 there were 132
companies and $44 billion as compared to 107 companies and $40 billion in 1999. See Brady, Vazza and Bos
(2003) for a historical summary of corporate defaults since 1980.
5See Elton et al (2001) for an analysis of the determinants of corporate bond spreads (relative to Trea-
suries). The authors ﬁnd that in addition to the expected default loss, other factors, such as taxes and risk
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than the return correlations, and exhibit a similar pattern of an increase in magnitude during
the 21 day event window surrounding a default date. Second, consistent with a view that
the monitoring role of loans should reﬂect in more precise expectations embedded in loan
prices, e.g., the surprise or unexpected component of a default is likely to be smaller for
banks than for bond investors because banks are continuous monitors whereas monitoring
in the bond market is more diﬀuse, we ﬁnd that the price reaction of loans is less adverse
than that of bonds around loan and bond default dates. Third, where a loan default date
is not preceded a bond default date of the same company, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerential price
reaction of loans versus bonds is higher around such a loan default date since it also acts
as a ﬁrst signal of distress. Fourth, we ﬁnd a higher recovery rate for loans as compared to
bonds post-default, consistent with a view that the monitoring advantage of loans over bonds
is likely to continue post-default. Our results are robust to controlling for security-speciﬁc
characteristics, and for multiple measures of cumulative abnormal returns around default
defaults. Finally, our results also extend to stocks, allowing us to make a similar assessment
of the return performance of loans versus stocks. Overall, we ﬁnd that the loan market is
informationally more eﬃcient than the bond market around default dates.
The results of our paper have important implications especially in terms of the impact of
defaults on loans and bonds, the monitoring of loans versus bonds, and the beneﬁts of loan
monitoring role for other ﬁnancial markets, such as the bond market and the stock market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
sample selection. Section 3 presents the test hypotheses. Section 4 summarizes our empiri-
cal results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and sample selection
The sample period for our study is November 1, 1999 through June 30, 2002. Our choice
of the sample period was driven by data considerations, i.e., our empirical analysis requires
premiums associated with Fama-French factors are important in determining corporate bond spreads.
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secondary market daily prices of loans, which was not available prior to November 1, 1999.
We use several diﬀerent data sources in this study. First, our loan price dataset is
from the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) and Loan Pricing Corporation
(LPC) mark-to-market pricing service, supplied to over 100 institutions managing over $200
billion in bank loan assets.6 This unique dataset consists of daily bid and ask price quotes
aggregated across dealers. Each loan has a minimum of at least two dealer quotes and a
maximum of over 30 dealers, including all top loan broker-dealers.7 These price quotes are
obtained on a daily basis by LSTA in the late afternoon from the dealers and the price
quotes reﬂect the market events for the day. The items in this database include a unique
loan identiﬁcation number (LIN), name of the issuer (Company), type of loan, e.g., term
loan (facility), date of pricing (Pricing Date), average of bid quotes (Avg Bid), number of
bid quotes (Bid Quotes), average of second and third highest bid quote (High Bid Avg),
average of ask quotes (Avg Ask), number of ask quotes (Ask Quotes), average of second and
third lowest ask quotes (Low Ask Avg), and a type of classiﬁcation based on the number of
quotes received, e.g., Class II if 3 or more bid quotes. We have 543,526 loan-day observations
spanning 1,863 loans in our loan price dataset.
Second, the primary source for our bond price dataset is the Salomon (now Citigroup)
Yield Book. We extracted daily prices for all the companies for which we have loans in the
loan price dataset. We have 371,797 bond-day observations spanning 816 bonds. Third, for
robustness, we also created another bond price dataset from Datastream for a subset of loans
with a bond default date or a loan default date (the primary focus of our study), containing
91,760 bond-day observations spanning 248 bonds.
Fourth, the source for our stock return dataset is the Center for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP) daily stock return and daily index return ﬁles.
Fifth, our loan defaults dataset consists of loan defaults from the institutional loan mar-
6Since LSTA and LPC do not make a market in bank loans and are not directly or indirectly involved the
buying or selling of bank loans, the LSTA/LPC mark-to-market pricing service is expected to be independent
and objective.
7At the time we received the dataset from LSTA, there were 33 loan dealers providing quotes to the
LSTA/LPC mark-to-market pricing service.
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ket. We received these data from Portfolio Management Data (PMD), a business unit of
Standard & Poors which has been tracking loan defaults in the institutional loan market
since 1995.8
Sixth, the source for our bond defaults dataset is the “New York University (NYU)
Salomon Center’s Altman Bond Default Database”. It is a comprehensive dataset of domestic
corporate bond default dates starting from 1974.
Finally, the source for security-speciﬁc characteristics is the Loan Pricing Corporation
(LPC).
Due to an absence of a unique identiﬁer that ties all these datasets together, we manually
matched these datasets based on name of the company and other identifying variables, e.g.,
date (See Appendix 1 for more details on how these datasets were processed and combined).
3. Test hypotheses
In this section, we develop test hypotheses pertaining to the informational eﬃciency of
the loan market as compared to that of the bond market surrounding loan default dates
and bond default dates. Our central premise is that loans have a monitoring advantage
over bonds. Several theoretical models highlight the unique monitoring function of banks
(see for example, Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Fama, 1985). These
studies generally argue that banks have a comparative cost advantage in monitoring loan
agreements which helps reduce the moral hazard costs of new debt ﬁnancing. For example,
Fama (1985) argues that banks, as insiders, have access to inside information whereas out-
side (public) debt holders must rely mostly on publicly available information, such as new
bank loan agreements.9 Diamond (1984, 1991) contends that banks have scale economies
and comparative cost advantages in information production that enable them to undertake
superior debt-related monitoring. Further, diﬀused public debt ownership and associated
free-rider problem diminish bondholder’ incentive to engage in costly information produc-
8Portfolio Management Data, a unit of Standard & Poor’s has recently changed its name to “Standard
& Poor’s Leveraged Commentary & Data”.
9James (1987) ﬁnds evidence that support an informational role that links loan agreements to favorable
stock price reactions.
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tion and monitoring. This results in higher agency costs relative to bank debt, which is
typically concentrated. Several empirical studies, such as James (1987), Mikkelson and
Partch (1986), Lummer and McConnell (1989), Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2003)
also provide evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans.
We argue that the incentives to monitor are likely to be preserved even when a loan is sold
in the secondary market. First, a loan buyer may have an implicit recourse to the bank selling
the loan. Gorton and Pennacchi (1989) document evidence consistent with the presence of
implicit guarantees to loan buyers to sell the loans back to the selling bank. Second, the
lead bank, which typically holds the largest share of a syndicated loan (see Kroszner and
Strahan (2001) for details) rarely sells its share of a loan. Third, not all participants in a
loan syndicate sell their share of a loan, and therefore continue to have incentives to monitor.
Finally, a bank who serves as a loan dealer will have incentives to monitor loans that are in
its inventory. Consequently, the monitoring role of loans has important implications for the
informational eﬃciency of the loan market versus the bond market.
We next hypothesize two testable implications of the monitoring role of loans; the ﬁrst
one relates to the return performance around default dates, and the second one relates to
the recovery rates around default dates.
3.1. Return performance around default dates
The monitoring advantage of loans over bonds implies that loans are likely to have timely
and superior expectations built into their prices because banks are continuous monitors as
compared to investors in the bond markets where monitoring tends to be more diﬀuse and
subject to free rider problems. Hence, the unexpected (or surprise) component of a loan
default event or a bond default is likely to be lower for loans than for bonds.10 This leads
to our ﬁrst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Default expectation). The unexpected (or surprise) component of a
10This assumes a partial spillover of the loan monitoring beneﬁts to bonds − if bonds realize the full
beneﬁt of loan monitoring, the information used in forming loan and bond prices is likely to be identical.
Whether the spillover is full or only partial is ﬁnally an empirical issue. Our results, discussed in Section 4
are consistent only with a partial spillover of the beneﬁt of loan monitoring from loans to bonds.
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default event is likely to be lower for loans relative to bonds.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we expect the price reaction of loans to be signiﬁcantly
lower than the price reaction of bonds around loan default dates and bond default dates.
3.2. Recovery rates around default dates
A related issue is whether the monitoring advantage of loans over bonds is likely to
continue post-default. We conjecture this to be the case based on the view that loans will
continue to have a stronger incentive to monitor and reorganize post-default as compared to
publicly issued bonds. This leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (Post-default monitoring). The recovery rate is likely to be higher for
loans as compared to bonds post-default after controlling for contractual diﬀerences.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, one would expect a higher recovery rate for loans as com-
pared to bonds, post-default, after controlling for contractual or security-speciﬁc attributes,
such as, maturity, size, and seniority of both instruments.
4. Empirical results
We begin this section with an analysis of the return and price correlations of loans and
bonds. We follow this analysis with the results from testing the hypotheses outlined in Sec-
tion 3. We end this section with a discussion of whether our results also extend to markets
other than loans and bonds, such as stocks.
4.1. Return and price correlations of loans and bonds
Table 1 presents the average price correlation, return correlation, and t-statistic of loan-
bond pairs of the same company around loan and bond default dates. We compute a daily
loan return based on the mid price quote of a loan, namely the average of the bid and ask
price of a loan in the loan price dataset.11 That is, a one day loan return is computed as
11We calculate returns based on the mid price, i.e., the quote mid point to abstract away from the bid-ask
bounce. See, for example, Stoll (2000) and Hasbrouck (1988) for more details.
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today’s mid price divided by yesterday’s mid price of the loan minus one. The daily bond
returns are computed based on the price of a bond in the Salomon Yield Book in an analogous
manner. A correlation coeﬃcient and a t-statistic (of whether the correlation coeﬃcient is
statistically diﬀerent from zero) is computed for each loan-bond pair of the same company
as long as we have at least ﬁve observations during the time period of interest.12 While the
return correlations are generally low − as we approach closer to a signiﬁcant event, such as a
default, a loan-bond pair shows a greater commonality or positive correlation in returns. For
example, the average return correlation between loan-bond pairs of the same company is 0.43
(average t-statistic on the correlations is 2.64, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) during the 21 day
event window surrounding a loan default date as compared to 0.12 (average t-statistic 1.97,
signiﬁcant at the 5% level) during the 234 day estimation window preceding the 21 day event
window. The corresponding loan-bond pair correlations around bond default dates are 0.15
during the 21 day event window as compared to 0.01 during the 234 day estimation window
− however, the average t-statistics on the correlations are not statistically signiﬁcant at any
meaningful level of signiﬁcance. This ﬁnding reﬂects the increasing importance of default
risk premiums in explaining loan and bond returns as compared to other factors (see footnote
5) as we approach a default date.
The price correlations in Table 1 are signiﬁcantly higher than the return correlations,
and exhibit a similar pattern of an increase in magnitude during the 21 day event window
surrounding a default date. For example, the average price correlation of a loan-bond pair of
the same company is 0.82 (average t-statistic 11.30, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) during the 21
day event window surrounding a loan default date as compared to 0.57 (average t-statistic
13.94, also signiﬁcant at the 1% level) during the 234 day estimation window preceding the
21 day event window. The corresponding loan-bond pair correlations around bond default
dates are 0.61 (average t-statistic 5.39, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) during the 21 day event
12We test whether a speciﬁc correlation coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero by comparing rxy
√
N−2√
1−r2xy
,
where rxy is the correlation coeﬃcient, N is the number of observations, with the critical value from a t-
distribution with N − 2 degrees of freedom at the desired level of signiﬁcance based on a two-tailed test. See
SAS Procedures guide (Version 8) for more details.
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window as compared to 0.46 (average t-statistic 9.97, also signiﬁcant at the 1% level) during
the 234 day estimation window.
For robustness purposes, we also used daily prices and returns from Datastream instead
of the Salomon Yield Book. These correlations are shown in Table 2. Clearly, the correlations
in Table 2 are quite similar to the ones in Table 1, albeit marginally lower. Hence for the
remainder of the paper, we present our results using bond price and return data from the
Salomon Yield Book.
Correlations such as those presented in Tables 1 and 2 provide useful information about
the commonality of returns and prices. However, to understand the magnitude of the dif-
ference in return performance, one needs to examine the cumulative abnormal returns sur-
rounding default dates. We turn our attention to these measures in the following subsections.
4.2. Return performance around default dates
In this section, we empirically test the default expectation hypothesis. First, we present
univariate comparisons of cumulative abnormal returns of loan-bond pairs, matched initially
based on the name of the borrower, and later on based on additional attributes such as ma-
turity and issue size. Next, we follow our univariate analysis with evidence from multivariate
tests where we simultaneously control for security speciﬁc characteristics, such as maturity,
issue size, seniority, and collateral of loans and bonds.
4.2.1. Univariate results
We conduct an event study analysis to examine the impact of corporate defaults on
secondary market loan prices and bond prices. We examine two types of default, namely
loan defaults, and bond defaults. We measure return performance surrounding default dates
by cumulating daily abnormal returns during a pre-speciﬁed window surrounding a default
date. We present empirical evidence for three diﬀerent event windows: 3-day window [-1,+1],
11-day window [-5,+5] and a 21-day window [-10,+10], where day 0 refers to the default date.
We use several diﬀerent methods to compute daily abnormal returns. First, on an un-
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adjusted basis, i.e., using the raw returns, as a ﬁrst-approximation of the magnitude of the
return impact on a loan or a bond of the same corporation around default dates. Three
other return measures are also examined based on test methodologies described in Brown
and Warner (1985). Speciﬁcally and secondly a mean-adjusted return, i.e., average daily
return during the 234 day estimation time period ([-244,-11]), is subtracted from a loan or
bond daily return. The third and fourth measures are based on a single-factor market index
(we use the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index as a market index for loans, and the Lehman
Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index as a market index for bonds).13 Thus, the
third measure is a market-adjusted return, i.e., the return on a market index is subtracted
from a loan or bond daily return and the fourth is a market-model adjusted return, i.e.,
the predicted return based on a market-model regression is subtracted from a loan or bond
return. We also used two diﬀerent types of multi-factor models for estimating abnormal
returns: (a) a three-factor model where the three factors are the return on a loan index, the
return on a bond index, and the return on a stock index, and (b) the three-factor model of
Fama and French (1993).14 The predicted return from a multi-factor model is subtracted
from a loan or bond daily return. More formally,
Ai,t = Ri,t − E[Ri,t], (1)
where Ai,t is the abnormal return, Ri,t is the observed arithmetic return,
15 and E[Ri,t] is
the expected return for security i at date t. The six diﬀerent methods of computing daily
abnormal returns correspond to six diﬀerent expressions for the expected return for security
i at date t. That is,
13While the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index is a daily series, the S&P/LSTA
Leveraged Loan Index is a weekly series during our sample period. For computing market-adjusted and
market-model adjusted daily abnormal returns of loans around default dates, we converted the S&P/LSTA
Leveraged Loan Index weekly series to a daily series through linear intrapolation.
14The returns on the Fama and French (1993) factors are obtained from Professor Kenneth French’s website
http://mba.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
15That is, Ri,t = Pi,t/Pi,t−1 − 1, where Pi,t and Pi,t−1 denote the price for security i at time t and t-1.
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E[Ri,t] =


0 unadjusted
R¯i mean-adjusted
RMKT,t market-adjusted
αˆi + βˆiRMKT,t market-model adjusted
αˆi + βˆi,1RL,t + βˆi,2RB,t + βˆi,3RS,t three-factor model adjusted
αˆi + βˆi,1RS,t + βˆi,2RHML,t + βˆi,3RSMB,t three-factor model (Fama-French) adjusted
where R¯i is the simple average of security i’s daily returns during the 234-day estimation
period (i.e., [-244,-11]):
R¯i =
1
234
t=−11∑
t=−244
Ri,t. (2)
RMKT,t is the return on a market index deﬁned as below:
RMKT,t =


RL,t loan index
RB,t bond index
RS,t stock index
where RL,t is the return on the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index, RB,t is the return
on the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index, RS,t is the return on
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted index, RHML,t is the return on a zero-investment
portfolio return based on book-to-market, and RSMB,t is the return on a zero-investment
portfolio return based on size for day t. The coeﬃcients αˆi and βˆi are Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) values from the market-model regression during the estimation time period.
That is, we regress security i’s returns on market index returns and a constant term to obtain
OLS estimates of αˆi and βˆi during the estimation time period.
16 The intercept and slope
16Where we do not have return data for the full estimation period, to ensure that we have reasonable
estimates (e.g., lower standard errors), we require at least 50 observations to compute the mean-adjusted
and market-model adjusted abnormal returns. While the unadjusted and market-adjusted abnormal return
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coeﬃcients for the multi-factor models are deﬁned analogously to the single-factor models.
The test statistic under the null hypothesis (of zero abnormal returns) for any event day
and for multi-day windows surrounding default dates is described below.17 The test statistic
for any day t is the ratio of the average abnormal return to its standard error, estimated
from the time-series of average abnormal returns. More formally,
A¯t
Sˆ(A¯t)
∼ N(0, 1), (3)
A¯t =
1
Nt
Nt∑
i=1
Ai,t, (4)
Sˆ(A¯t) =
√√√√√ 1
233

 t=−11∑
t=−244
(A¯t − A∗)2

, (5)
A∗ =
1
234
t=−11∑
t=−244
A¯t, (6)
where Nt is the number of securities whose abnormal returns are available at day t. For tests
over multi-day intervals, e.g., [-5,+5], the test statistic is the ratio of the cumulative average
abnormal return (which we simply refer to as CAR) to its estimated standard error, and is
given by
t=+5∑
t=−5
A¯t
/√√√√t=+5∑
t=−5
Sˆ2(A¯t) ∼ N(0, 1). (7)
Table 3 presents the event study results for loan-bond pairs of the same company using
the market-model adjusted method. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with the default expectation
hypothesis described in Section 3.1, namely that loan returns decline by a smaller amount
compared to bonds around default days. Speciﬁcally, loans fall by 19.51% during the 21 day
procedures do not need any minimum number of observations, we still employ the same criteria of requiring
at least 50 observations to ensure comparability of the diﬀerent abnormal return measures.
17Please see Brown and Warner (1985), pp. 7-8, and pp. 28-29 for more details.
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[-10,+10] window surrounding loan default dates, while bonds fall by 47.40%. The diﬀerence
in the loan average CAR (loan ACAR) and the bond average CAR (bond ACAR) of 27.89%
(i.e., -19.51%-(-47.40%)) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Z-stat 4.51).18 Similar
results are found surrounding bond default dates as well. That is, loans fall by 20.00% during
the 21 day window surrounding bond default dates, as compared to the 33.73% fall for bonds.
The diﬀerence in ACARs of 13.73% is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (Z-stat 1.72).
Other event windows, namely 3 day [-1,+1] window, and 11 day [-5,+5] window surrounding
loan default days and bond default dates produce similar results.19 So, while ﬁrms typically
show signs of operating and ﬁnancial problems prior to default, there is signiﬁcant price
deterioration just prior to and just after the event date as evidenced in the larger event
window, e.g., 21 day window.
For robustness purposes, we also present the event study results for loan-bond pairs of
the same company using the Fama-French three-factor model in Table 4. Clearly, the results
in Table 4 are quite similar to the ones in Table 3. We also examined the event study results
using the remaining four measures: (a) unadjusted, (b) mean-adjusted, (c) market-adjusted,
and (d) a three-factor model (where the three factors are the return on a loan index, the
return on a bond index, and the return on a stock index) adjusted CARs. The results,
reported in Appendices 2, 3, 4 and 5 are qualitatively similar. Hence for the remainder of
the paper, we present our event study results based on market-model adjusted CARs.
In summary (so far), we ﬁnd support for the default expectation hypothesis. That is,
the price reaction of loans is less adverse as compared to that of bonds around loan default
dates and bond default dates. Our results are generally robust to the choice of event window
(i.e., 3-day, 11-day or 21-day event window), as well as the choice of the method of comput-
ing abnormal returns (i.e., unadjusted, mean-adjusted, market-adjusted, or market-model
adjusted). However, the event study results have, so far, controlled only for the company
name, and not for security speciﬁc characteristics, such as maturity, issue size, seniority, and
18The Z statistic for the diﬀerence in ACARs is based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of matched
loan-bond pairs.
19The only exception is that the diﬀerence in ACARs for the 3 day window around bond default dates has
the predicted sign but is not statistically signiﬁcant.
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collateral information underlying a loan or a bond. We next turn our attention to these
issues.
Table 5 presents the event study analysis for loan-bond pairs of the same company, also
matched on the maturity of the loan or bond. Table 6 presents a similar analysis of loan-
bond pairs of the same company, also matched on the size of the loan or bond. We consider
as matches a loan and a bond of the same company provided the diﬀerence in the attribute
that we additionally match on (such as maturity, or size) is less than 25%. The results in
these tables are qualitatively similar to the ones discussed above.20
We next test the robustness of these results using multivariate tests that better control
for security speciﬁc characteristics, such as maturity, issue size, seniority, and collateral.
4.2.2. Multivariate results
For ease of interpretation, we deﬁne the dependent variable as the negative cumulative
abnormal return (NCAR), i.e., NCAR = -CAR, which we simply refer to as “price decline”.
We focus on market-model adjusted NCAR during the 21-day event window, i.e., [-10,+10].
To measure the priority structure of loans and bonds, we incorporate the seniority and
collateral information of a loan or a bond, using the classiﬁcation of Altman and Kishore
(1996). We classify the loans and bonds into four diﬀerent categories (see Appendix 1 for
details) based on security-speciﬁc information from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) for
loans, and the description of a bond in the bond default dataset, i.e., (a) Senior secured,
(b) Senior unsecured, (c) Senior subordinated, and (d) Subordinated and others.21 We
categorize these descriptive variables into three separate dummy variables corresponding
to: Senior secured, Senior unsecured, and Senior subordinated types.22 The independent
20It may be noted that the number of observations in Tables 5 and 6 are signiﬁcantly lower than in Tables
3 and 4 due to the additional restriction of matching on maturity or issue size − this should not be surprising
considering that loans and bonds have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent dispersion around widely diﬀerent mean levels
on attributes such as maturity and issue size.
21We combine others, such as discount and junior subordinated categories (since there were relatively few
such loans and bonds) with the Subordinated into a single category.
22To avoid the problem of linear dependence of the independent variables in an OLS regression, we can
only include three dummy variables (of the four). We drop the dummy corresponding to “Subordinated and
others”.
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variables used in some or all of the OLS regressions are:
LOAN DUMMY: An indicator variable that takes a value of one for a loan, and zero other-
wise.
LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY: An indicator variable that takes a value of one if it is a loan
default, and zero otherwise.
LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS: An interactive indicator variable that takes
a value of one if it is a loan and if the loan default is not preceded by a bond default date of
the same loan-bond pair, and zero otherwise.
LN(MATURITY): Stands for natural log of one plus remaining maturity (in years) as on a
default date.
LN(AMOUNT): Stands for natural log of one plus amount of the loan or bond issue (in $
millions).
SENIOR SECURED: An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a loan or a bond is
senior secured, and zero otherwise.
SENIOR UNSECURED: An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a loan or a bond
is senior unsecured, and zero otherwise.
SENIOR SUBORDINATED: An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a loan or
bond is senior subordinated, and zero otherwise.
4.2.2.1. Discussion of the variables
We test the default expectation hypothesis described in Section 3.1 by examining the
predicted sign of the LOAN DUMMY coeﬃcient. We expect the LOAN DUMMY coeﬃcient
to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
We include the following variables as control variables: First, LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY,
an indicator variable for the type of default, namely whether it is a loan default or a bond
default. On one hand, as delegated monitors, banks are expected to be better able to distin-
guish ex ante among good and bad borrowers relative to investors in the bond markets where
monitoring tends to be diﬀuse and subject to free rider problems. Strictly interpreted, this
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implies that loan defaults should be rare events. Consequently, a loan default, when it does
occur, is likely to be more surprising than a bond default, and may reﬂect the potential loss of
reputation of the bank (see Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2003)). However, on the other
hand, it can be argued that loan defaults are, by deﬁnition, less surprising than bond de-
faults since there is more information associated with loans. Whether the LOAN DEFAULT
DUMMY will have a positive coeﬃcient or a negative coeﬃcient depends on which of these
two eﬀects dominate. Second, LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS, an interactive
indicator variable that reﬂects the timing of a default date and additionally serves as the
ﬁrst signal of ﬁnancial distress.23 As a result, the measured eﬀect of the LOAN DUMMY is
expected to be ampliﬁed when a loan default leads or a bond default leads, i.e., we expect the
interactive indicator variable to have a negative sign. Third, LN(MATURITY). We expect
this variable to have a positive coeﬃcient since longer-maturity debt issues are potentially
subject to a greater interest-rate risk exposure, and can have a higher default risk (Flannery,
1986). Fourth, LN(AMOUNT). Larger issues, on one hand, are likely to be associated with
less uncertainty, and have more public information associated with them. However, on the
other hand, larger issues may be more diﬃcult to reorganize post-default. Whether the sign
of the LN(AMOUNT) coeﬃcient is positive or negative is an empirical question as to which
of these two eﬀects dominates. Finally, the priority structure reﬂects the protection or safety
cushion to the loan or bond holder in the event of default. For example, we expect the price
decline for a SENIOR SECURED security to be the least, followed by that of a SENIOR
UNSECURED security, which in turn is lower than that of a SENIOR SUBORDINATED
security. Accordingly, we expect the coeﬃcient of the SENIOR SECURED variable to be
smaller than that of the SENIOR UNSECURED variable, which in turn should be smaller
than that of the SENIOR SUBORDINATED variable.
23Of the 74 loan-bond pairs in Table 3, 43 cases are when the loan default leads, 5 cases are when the
bond default leads, and the remaining 26 loan-bond pairs comprise simultaneous loan-bond defaults, i.e.,
loan and bond defaults within two days of each other. Since there are relatively few instances (ﬁve) where
a bond default leads, we did not include an additional interactive indicator variable due to concerns of
multicollinearity.
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4.2.2.2. Multivariate regression results
The multivariate regression results are presented in Tables 7-9.24 Table 7 presents the
regression results on loan default dates only. Table 8 presents the regression results on bond
default days only. Table 9 presents the results for loan and bond default days. The details
of these regressions are discussed below.
Speciﬁcally in Table 7, we test six diﬀerent speciﬁcations. We start with Model 1 where
we regress NCAR on LOAN DUMMY. The coeﬃcient on the LOAN DUMMY is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the price decline is 27.89% lower for loans as
compared to bonds.25 Next, we augment Model 1 with the LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DE-
FAULT LEADS indicator variable to run the regression Model 2. The coeﬃcient on LOAN
DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS variable is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, sug-
gesting that the price decline is 29.66% lower for loans as compared to bonds around loan
default dates that are not preceded by a bond default of the same company. Following
regression Model 2, we augment Model 1 with LN(MATURITY) and LN(AMOUNT) as
additional control variables to run the regression Model 3. The LOAN DUMMY continues
to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Next, we augment Model 1 with the indicator
variables for the priority structure, namely SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED,
and SENIOR SUBORDINATED to run the regression Model 4. The LOAN DUMMY con-
tinues to be statistically signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcients on the priority structure variables
have the correct sign and the correct relative magnitudes. We next augment Model 4 with
LN(MATURITY) and LN(AMOUNT) to run the regression Model 5. The LOAN DUMMY
continues to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, we augment Model 5 with
the LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS indicator variable. Interestingly, both
the LOAN DUMMY and LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS variables are each
negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 8 presents the regression results around bond default dates only. The LOAN
24The results are qualitatively unchanged when the inference is based on White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity
adjusted t-statistics (not reported here).
25This is exactly the diﬀerence in loan and bond ACARs from Table 3, i.e., -19.51 - (-47.40) = 27.89%.
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DUMMY is negative in all six speciﬁcations, and statistically signiﬁcant in the last three
cases (Models 4-6). The LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant around loan default dates but is insigniﬁcant around bond default
dates.
Finally, Table 9 combines the loan-bond pairs around loan default dates with the loan-
bond pairs around bond default dates. By combining, we are able to augment each of the six
regression speciﬁcations with a LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY which has the expected sign.
Overall, based on the regression results, we ﬁnd evidence consistent with the default ex-
pectation hypothesis described in Section 3.1. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the price reaction of
loans is less adverse than that of bonds around both loan and bond default dates − our re-
sults are robust to controlling for security-speciﬁc characteristics, such as maturity, seniority,
and for a variety of methods to measure price declines around default dates. Interestingly,
the price decline is signiﬁcantly much lower for loans as compared to bonds around loan
default dates that are not preceded by a bond default date.
4.2.2. Results of simultaneous loan-bond defaults
In the multivariate regression results in Section 4.2.1., we controlled for the diﬀerence in
timing of loan defaults and bond defaults through the indicator variable LOAN DUMMY x
LOAN DEFAULT LEADS. As an additional robustness test, we focus our attention on the
26 loan-bond pairs with simultaneous loan-bond defaults. This subsample of 26 loan-bond
pairs is not inﬂuenced by any timing diﬀerences between loan and bond default days, and
hence can be used to test our monitoring story more directly. However given the small size
of this sample, we need to be cautious in the interpretation of the results.
The univariate results of the raw unadjusted returns (our ﬁrst measure of cumulative
abnormal returns) are shown in Appendix 6. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with the default
expectation hypothesis described in Section 3.1. That is, we ﬁnd that the LOAN ACAR
is signiﬁcantly lower than the BOND ACAR for the [-5,+5] and [-10,+10] event windows.
The results are qualitatively similar with the market-model adjusted CARs (see Appendix
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7), albeit marginally weaker.
We also ran the regression speciﬁcations in Table 7 for the sample of 26 loan-bond pairs
with simultaneous loan-bond defaults. The results are shown in Appendix 8.26 Once again,
the results are qualitatively similar − the LOAN DUMMY coeﬃcient has the predicted
negative sign in all the regression speciﬁcations, and is statistically signiﬁcant in the more
complete models, i.e., Models 3-4.
4.3. Recovery rates around default dates
A related issue is whether we ﬁnd a higher expected recovery rate for loans as compared
to bonds. Speciﬁcally, we examine the determinants of recovery rates of loans versus bonds
around default dates in this section.
4.3.1. Univariate results
As hypothesized in Section 3.2 (post-default monitoring hypothesis), to the extent that
the monitoring advantage of loans over bonds is likely to continue post-default, one would
expect a higher recovery rate for loans as compared to that of bonds.
Table 10 presents the correlation between cumulative returns and two traditional mea-
sures of recovery rates, namely, the trading price immediately at default, and the trading
price one month after default.27 The correlations with the two traditional measures of recov-
ery rates are positive and relatively high for both loans (0.80-0.85 for loan default dates and
0.59-0.60 for bond default dates) and bonds (0.46-0.65 for loan default dates and 0.28-0.47
for bond default dates). This evidence, together with the evidence presented in Section 4.1
26Since the subsample of 26 loan-bond pairs contains only simultaneous loan-bond defaults, we cannot
include the LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS interactive variable in all the regression speciﬁca-
tions. That is, Model 2 and Model 6 are identical to Model 1 and Model 5 respectively (in Table 7) for our
subsample. Consequently, Appendix 8 contains only four speciﬁcations.
27See Altman and Kishore (1996) and Altman (1993) for more details. A useful proxy for the expected
recovery rate in default is the average price around default. Prices at or soon after default are used in many
default studies and reports, e.g., Altman (annually), Moody’s (annually), as well as in the settlement process
in the credit default swap market (usually 30 days after default). An alternative measure for the recovery
rate is the price at the end of the restructuring process, e.g.,. Chapter 11 emergence, discounted back to the
default date (See Altman and Eberhart (1994)). We have not used this measure since many of the defaults
in our study period have not been concluded and the data is not readily available even when completed.
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suggests that the recovery rates for loans can be expected to be higher than that of bonds.28
The univariate results presented here, while consistent with the post-default monitoring
hypothesis, do not explicitly control for security speciﬁc characteristics, such as maturity,
issue size, seniority etc. We examine this issue next through multivariate analysis.
4.3.2. Multivariate results
The dependent variable is the recovery rate of a loan or a bond, as proxied by the price
at default. For example, when measuring the dependent variable on a loan default date, we
use the loan price on the loan default date, and the matched bond price also on the same
loan default date. We follow a similar procedure for bond default dates. The independent
variables are as deﬁned in Section 4.1.3.
Table 11 presents the regression results. We ﬁnd evidence consistent with the post-default
monitoring hypothesis described in Section 3.2. Of particular interest is the coeﬃcient on
LOAN DUMMY which is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all the six
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. It may also be noted that in our more complete speciﬁcations, i.e., in
Models 5 and 6 where we have the highest explanatory power (as measured by Adjusted R2),
neither the timing of the loan default nor the type of default (i.e., whether it is a loan default
or a bond default) is statistically signiﬁcant from zero at any meaningful level of signiﬁcance.
4.4. Extensions
In this section we examine whether our results also extend to stocks, allowing us to make
a similar assessment of the return performance of loans and stocks. This will also allow us
to benchmark our loan-bond results.
Table 12 presents event study results for loan-stock pairs. This table includes matched
loan-stock pairs where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted
method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the return based on a market-model re-
gression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index for loans, or
28See Appendix 9 for a summary of recovery rates by debt type and seniority from 1988-2Q 2003.
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a value-weighted NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX index for stocks) is subtracted from the loan or
stock daily return respectively.
We ﬁnd evidence consistent with the default expectation hypothesis described in Section
3.1, namely that loan returns fall by a smaller amount as compared to stocks around default
days. In particular, loans fell by 4.87% during the 11 day [-5,+5] window surrounding loan
default dates, while stocks fell by 32.84%. The diﬀerence in the loan average CAR (loan
ACAR) and the stock average CAR (stock ACAR) of 27.97% (i.e., -4.87%-(-32.84%)) is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Z-stat 2.94). Similar results are found surrounding bond
default dates as well. Speciﬁcally, loans fell by 4.30% during the 11 day window surrounding
bond default dates, as compared to the 25.39% fall for stocks. The diﬀerence in ACARs
of 21.09% is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Z-stat 4.57). Other event windows,
namely 3 day [-1,+1] window, and 21 day [-10,+10] windows produce similar results with
the exception of the 21 day window around bond default dates (has the predicted sign but
is not statistically signiﬁcant).
5. Conclusions
This paper examines the information eﬃciency of loans relative to bonds surrounding
loan default dates and bond default dates using a unique dataset of daily secondary market
prices during 11/1999-06/2002. We ﬁnd that the return correlation between loans and bonds
is relatively low for the entire sample period but is considerably higher during a 21-day event
window surrounding a default date. The price correlations are signiﬁcantly higher than the
return correlations, and exhibit a similar pattern of an increase in magnitude during the 21
day event window surrounding a default date.
Consistent with a view that the surprise or unexpected component of a default is likely
to be smaller for banks than for bond investors because banks are continuous monitors
whereas monitoring in the bond market is more diﬀuse, we ﬁnd that the price reaction of
loans is less adverse than that of bonds around loan and bond default dates. Interestingly,
where a loan default date is not preceded a bond default date of the same company, we
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ﬁnd that the diﬀerential price reaction of loans versus bonds is higher around such a loan
default date since it also acts as a ﬁrst signal of distress. Finally, we ﬁnd a higher recovery
rate for loans as compared to bonds post-default, consistent with a view that the monitor-
ing advantage of loans over bonds is likely to continue post-default. Overall, we ﬁnd that
the loan market is informationally more eﬃcient than the bond market around default dates.
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TABLE 1
Average return and price correlations between loans and bonds around default dates
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average correlation and the average t-statistic (of testing whether the correlation
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero) between: (a) daily returns of loans and bonds, and (b) daily
prices of loans and bonds of the same company around default dates. The price and return data for loans
is from the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) and the price and return data for bonds is
from the Salomon Yield Book. The average correlations are presented for the overall sample period and for
several segments of time periods: (a) Pre-estimation period: on or preceding day -245, (b) Estimation period:
[-244,-11], which is further broken down into sub periods as shown below, (c) Event window: [-10,+10], and
(d) Post-event period: on or following day +11, where day 0 refers to the loan default date in Panel A, and
to the bond default date in Panel B. The superscripts a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan Default Dates
Return correlation Price correlation
Time Period Mean T-statistic Mean T-statistic
Pre-estimation period [≤-245] -0.00 -0.22 0.50 9.27a
Estimation period [-244,-11] 0.12 1.97b 0.57 13.94a
– Subsegment [-244,-121] 0.02 0.29 0.55 7.50a
– Subsegment [-61,-120] 0.02 0.10 0.38 4.81a
– Subsegment [-31,-60] 0.03 0.14 0.46 5.07a
– Subsegment [-11,-30] 0.26 1.34 0.70 4.68a
Event window [-10,+10] 0.43 2.64a 0.82 11.30a
Post-event period [≥ +11] 0.02 0.34 0.42 6.81a
Panel B: Bond Default Dates
Return correlation Price correlation
Time Period Mean T-statistic Mean T-statistic
Pre-estimation period [≤-245] 0.01 0.01 0.48 9.11a
Estimation period [-244,-11] 0.01 0.13 0.46 9.97a
– Subsegment [-244,-121] 0.01 0.19 0.56 8.56a
– Subsegment [-61,-120] -0.02 -0.25 0.25 3.62a
– Subsegment [-31,-60] 0.03 0.24 0.27 2.52b
– Subsegment [-11,-30] -0.00 -0.00 0.49 2.90a
Event window [-10,+10] 0.15 0.93 0.61 5.39a
Post-event period [≥ +11] 0.04 0.44 0.37 6.55a
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TABLE 2
Average return and price correlations between loans and bonds around default dates
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average correlation and the average t-statistic (of testing whether the correlation
coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero) between: (a) daily returns of loans and bonds, and (b) daily
prices of loans and bonds of the same company around default dates. The price and return data for loans
is from the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) and the price and return data for bonds is
from the Datastream. The average correlations are presented for the overall sample period and for several
segments of time periods: (a) Pre-estimation period: on or preceding day -245, (b) Estimation period: [-
244,-11], which is further broken down into sub periods as shown below, (c) Event window: [-10,+10], and
(d) Post-event period: on or following day +11, where day 0 refers to the loan default date in Panel A, and
to the bond default date in Panel B. The superscripts a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan Default Dates
Return correlation Price correlation
Time Period Mean t-statistic Mean t-statistic
Pre-estimation period [≤-245] 0.02 0.07 0.29 5.61a
Estimation period [-244,-11] 0.19 3.00a 0.53 14.79a
– Subsegment [-244,-121] 0.03 0.34 0.35 5.77a
– Subsegment [-61,-120] 0.10 0.78 0.38 5.53a
– Subsegment [-31,-60] 0.15 1.01 0.42 5.60a
– Subsegment [-11,-30] 0.15 0.96 0.10 0.26
Event window [-10,+10] 0.22 1.16 0.59 7.55a
Post-event period [≥ +11] 0.04 0.44 0.31 8.73a
Panel B: Bond Default Dates
Return correlation Price correlation
Time Period Mean t-statistic Mean t-statistic
Pre-estimation period [≤-245] 0.07 2.25b 0.20 5.71a
Estimation period [-244,-11] 0.07 0.96 0.46 11.93a
– Subsegment [-244,-121] 0.01 0.23 0.43 9.06a
– Subsegment [-61,-120] 0.06 0.50 0.21 3.52a
– Subsegment [-31,-60] 0.05 0.60 0.36 3.53a
– Subsegment [-11,-30] 0.01 0.07 -0.08 -1.55
Event window [-10,+10] 0.20 1.04 0.40 3.40a
Post-event period [≥ +11] 0.02 0.20 0.30 10.12a
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TABLE 3
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs around default dates
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default
date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute
the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the return
based on a market-model regression using a market index (such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index
for loans, or the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted from
the loan or bond daily return respectively. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed
using the methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional
dependence in returns. The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of
CARs of matched loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.06 -20.92 16.86
(-4.48)a (-9.13)a (7.71)a
[-5,+5 ] -9.82 -38.16 28.34
(-5.67)a (-8.69)a (6.56)a
[-10,+10 ] -19.51 -47.40 27.89
(-8.15)a (-7.82)a (4.51)a
Obs 74 74
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -3.37 -5.43 2.06
(-3.51)a (-2.09)b (0.83)
[-5,+5 ] -12.98 -28.84 15.86
(-7.07)a (-5.81)a (2.99)a
[-10,+10 ] -20.00 -33.73 13.73
(-7.88)a (-4.92)a (1.72)c
Obs 69 69
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TABLE 4
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs around default dates
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default
date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute the
CAR based on the Fama-French three factor model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That
is, the return based on the Fama-French three-factor market-model regression is subtracted from the loan or
bond daily return respectively. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed using the
methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence
in returns. The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of
matched loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.57 -21.09 16.52
(-4.99)a (-9.14)a (7.56)a
[-5,+5 ] -11.42 -38.39 26.97
(-6.51)a (-8.69)a (5.99)a
[-10,+10 ] -21.58 -47.16 25.58
(-8.91)a (-7.73)a (3.90)a
Obs 74 74
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -3.98 -5.74 1.76
(-4.04)a (-2.21)b (0.70)
[-5,+5 ] -14.64 -28.09 13.45
(-7.75)a (-5.65)a (2.54)b
[-10,+10 ] -22.46 -34.11 11.65
(-8.61)a (-4.97)a (1.41)
Obs 69 69
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TABLE 5
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs around default dates
(matched by borrower name, and maturity)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower and maturity) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a
bond default date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to
compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the
return based on a market-model regression using a market index (such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan
Index for loans, or the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted
from the loan or bond daily return respectively. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are
computed using the methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and
cross-sectional dependence in returns. The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired
diﬀerence test of CARs of matched loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand
for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -3.24 -16.34 13.10
(-1.94)c (-4.26)a (2.16)b
[-5,+5 ] -12.67 -55.38 42.71
(-3.96)a (-7.54)a (3.04)a
[-10,+10 ] -30.41 -55.92 25.51
(-6.88)a (-5.51)a (1.10)
Obs 15 15
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -0.44 -17.07 16.63
(-0.32) (-3.78)a (2.15)b
[-5,+5 ] -9.32 -49.12 39.80
(-3.61)a (−5.68)a (3.51)a
[-10,+10 ] -20.93 -47.80 26.87
(-5.86)a (−4.00)a (1.46)
Obs 19 19
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TABLE 6
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs around default dates
(matched by borrower name, and amount)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower and amount) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a
bond default date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to
compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the
return based on a market-model regression using a market index (such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan
Index for loans, or the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted
from the loan or bond daily return respectively. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are
computed using the methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and
cross-sectional dependence in returns. The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired
diﬀerence test of CARs of matched loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand
for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.05 -20.91 16.86
(-6.72)a (-10.29)a (3.60)a
[-5,+5 ] -7.98 -42.89 34.91
(-6.90)a (-11.02)a (3.06)a
[-10,+10 ] -21.47 -72.07 50.60
(-13.45)a (-13.40)a (3.66)a
Obs 15 15
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -0.32 -11.62 11.29
(-0.55) (-3.34)a (1.49)
[-5,+5 ] -6.25 -38.67 32.42
(-5.58)a (-5.81)a (2.39)b
[-10,+10 ] -20.25 -65.97 45.72
(-13.08)a (-7.17)a (2.40)b
Obs 13 13
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TABLE 7
Linear regression of negative cumulative abnormal return around loan default dates
This table presents OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations determining the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) performance of loans and bonds surrounding loan default dates. This table includes loans, and bonds
where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event
window. The dependent variable NEGATIVE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN, NCAR[-10,+10]
equals -CAR[-10,+10], where day [0] refers to a default date, namely the loan default date or the bond
default date of the same company. The CARs are computed based on market-model adjustment, i.e., the
return based on a market-model regression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan
Index for loans and the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted
from the loan or bond daily return. The independent variables are as follows: LOAN DUMMY takes a value
of one if it is a loan, and zero otherwise. LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS is an interactive
dummy variable that takes a value of one if it is a loan and if the loan default date is not preceded by a
bond default date for the same loan-bond pair, and zero otherwise. LN(MATURITY) stands for natural log
of one plus remaining maturity (in years) as on a default date. LN(AMOUNT) stands for natural log of
one plus amount of the loan or bond issue (in $ millions). SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED,
and SENIOR SUBORDINATED each take a value of one if a loan or bond is classiﬁed like-wise and zero
otherwise. The t ratios are shown in parentheses (a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels using a two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable: -CAR[-10,+10], Market-model adjusted (%)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
INTERCEPT 47.40 46.80 12.81 88.46 -14.23 -6.98
(8.85)a (9.68)a (0.38) (8.68)a (-0.44) (-0.22)
LOAN DUMMY -27.89 -3.84 -17.28 -41.54 -34.53 -19.01
(-3.68)a (-0.29) (-2.15)b (−5.34)a (-4.67)a (-1.82)c
LOAN DUMMY x
LOAN DEFAULT LEADS -29.66 -24.46
(-2.20)b (-2.07)b
LN(MATURITY) 30.88 29.98 26.36
(3.49)a (4.17)a (3.60)a
LN(AMOUNT) -3.54 7.69 8.52
(-0.60) (1.51) (1.68)c
SENIOR SECURED -100.58 -105.99 -111.62
(-7.42)a (-8.31)a (-8.66)a
SENIOR UNSECURED -38.60 -22.33 -23.22
(-3.73)a (-2.15)b (-2.26)b
SENIOR SUBORDINATED -22.27 -16.86 -24.16
(-2.16)b (-1.73)c (-2.35)b
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 148
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.38 0.46 0.47
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TABLE 8
Linear regression of negative cumulative abnormal return around bond default dates
This table presents OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations determining the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) performance of loans and bonds surrounding loan default dates. This table includes loans, and bonds
where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event
window. The dependent variable NEGATIVE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN, NCAR[-10,+10]
equals -CAR[-10,+10], where day [0] refers to a default date, namely the loan default date or the bond
default date of the same company. The CARs are computed based on market-model adjustment, i.e., the
return based on a market-model regression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan
Index for loans and the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted
from the loan or bond daily return. The independent variables are as follows: LOAN DUMMY takes a value
of one if it is a loan, and zero otherwise. LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS is an interactive
dummy variable that takes a value of one if it is a loan and if the loan default date is not preceded by a
bond default date for the same loan-bond pair, and zero otherwise. LN(MATURITY) stands for natural log
of one plus remaining maturity (in years) as on a default date. LN(AMOUNT) stands for natural log of
one plus amount of the loan or bond issue (in $ millions). SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED,
and SENIOR SUBORDINATED each take a value of one if a loan or bond is classiﬁed like-wise and zero
otherwise. The t ratios are shown in parentheses (a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels using a two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable: -CAR[-10,+10], Market-model adjusted (%)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
INTERCEPT 33.73 33.73 -67.70 78.10 -45.35 -40.71
(4.76)a (4.74)a (-1.35) (6.58)a (-0.90) (-0.80)
LOAN DUMMY -13.73 -13.70 -6.38 -34.47 -27.27 -23.04
(-1.37) (-1.21) (-0.53) (−3.42)a (-2.28)b (-1.72)c
LOAN DUMMY x
LOAN DEFAULT LEADS -0.09 -10.39
(-0.01) (-0.71)
LN(MATURITY) 14.39 16.44 18.06
(1.05) (1.22) (1.32)
LN(AMOUNT) 12.19 14.52 13.64
(2.02)b (2.29)a (2.11)b
SENIOR SECURED -91.06 -93.64 -95.81
(-5.43)a (-5.45)a (-5.48)a
SENIOR UNSECURED -47.90 -32.69 -35.78
(-2.66)a (-1.72)c (-1.83)c
SENIOR SUBORDINATED -31.99 -25.44 -29.45
(-2.76)a (-1.91)c (-2.03)b
Observations 138 138 138 138 138 138
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.19 0.19
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TABLE 9
Linear regression of negative cumulative abnormal returns
This table presents OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations determining the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) performance of loans and bonds surrounding default dates. This table includes loans, and bonds
where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event
window. The dependent variable NEGATIVE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN, NCAR[-10,+10]
equals -CAR[-10,+10], where day [0] refers to a default date, namely the loan default date or the bond
default date of the same company. The CARs are computed based on market-model adjustment, i.e., the
return based on a market-model regression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan
Index for loans and the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted
from the loan or bond daily return. The independent variables are as follows: LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY
takes a value of one if it is a loan default, and zero otherwise. LOAN DUMMY takes a value of one if
it is a loan, and zero otherwise. LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT LEADS is an interactive dummy
variable that takes a value of one if it is a loan and if the loan default date is not preceded by a bond
default date for the same loan-bond pair, and zero otherwise. LN(MATURITY) stands for natural log
of one plus remaining maturity (in years) as on a default date. LN(AMOUNT) stands for natural log of
one plus amount of the loan or bond issue (in $ millions). SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED,
and SENIOR SUBORDINATED each take a value of one if a loan or bond is classiﬁed like-wise and zero
otherwise. The t ratios are shown in parentheses (a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels using a two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable: -CAR[-10,+10], Market-model adjusted (%)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
INTERCEPT 37.39 35.62 -48.02 78.01 -43.38 -36.18
(6.85)a (6.41)a (-1.69)c (9.58)a (-1.51) (-1.25)
LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY 6.60 10.01 11.80 12.39 15.77 19.09
(1.06) (1.52) (1.86)c (2.17)b (2.79)a (3.25)a
LOAN DUMMY -21.06 -12.39 -11.17 -38.18 -30.92 -22.22
(-3.38)a (-1.49) (-1.61) (−6.17)a (-4.80)a (-2.84)a
LOAN DUMMY x
LOAN DEFAULT LEADS -14.76 -17.07
(-1.56) (-1.95)c
LN(MATURITY) 19.48 20.38 20.65
(2.59)a (3.05)a (3.10)a
LN(AMOUNT) 7.67 13.13 12.19
(1.89)c (3.26)a (3.02)a
SENIOR SECURED -96.74 -101.75 -105.03
(-8.84)a (-9.56)a (-9.79)a
SENIOR UNSECURED -43.99 -29.41 -30.06
(-4.81)a (-3.05)a (-3.13)a
SENIOR SUBORDINATED -27.78 -22.60 -28.15
(-3.58)a (-2.81)a (-3.31)a
Observations 286 286 286 286 286 286
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.26 0.31 0.31
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TABLE 10
Correlation between cumulative returns and recovery rates around default dates
This table presents correlation between return performance, as measured by cumulative returns around
default dates, and proxies for recovery rates. We use two proxies for recovery rates, namely the price at
default, and the price a month after default. Panel A presents this information around loan default dates,
and Panel B presents this information around bond default dates.
Panel A: Loan Default Dates
Correlation with
cumulative returns of
Proxy for recovery rate Loans Bonds
Price at default 0.80 0.46
Price one month after default 0.85 0.65
Panel B: Bond Default Dates
Correlation with
cumulative returns of
Proxy for recovery rate Loans Bonds
Price at default 0.59 0.28
Price one month after default 0.60 0.47
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TABLE 11
Linear regression of recovery rates
This table presents OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations determining the recovery rates of loans and
bonds subsequent to a default date, namely a loan default date or a bond default date. For comparison with
our tables, we include in this table the loan-bond pairs of Table 9. The dependent variable, RECOVERY
RATE refers to the amount an investor expects from her investment in the loan or the bond subsequent to
the default date. We use the price at default as a proxy for the recovery rate. The independent variables
are as follows: LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY takes a value of one if it is a loan default, and zero otherwise.
LOAN DUMMY takes a value of one if it is a loan, and zero otherwise. LOAN DUMMY x LOAN DEFAULT
LEADS is an interactive dummy variable that takes a value of one if it is a loan and if the loan default date
is not preceded by a bond default date for the same loan-bond pair, and zero otherwise. LN(MATURITY)
stands for natural log of one plus remaining maturity (in years) as on a default date. LN(AMOUNT) stands
for natural log of one plus amount of the loan or bond issue (in $ millions). SENIOR SECURED, SENIOR
UNSECURED, and SENIOR SUBORDINATED each take a value of one if a loan or bond is classiﬁed
like-wise and zero otherwise. The t ratios are shown in parentheses (a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable: Recovery rate
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
INTERCEPT 21.13 20.81 110.18 7.82 68.98 69.15
(9.27)a (8.93)a (10.27)a (2.24)b (5.88)a (5.84)a
LOAN DEFAULT DUMMY 10.33 10.95 5.48 6.41 3.34 3.42
(3.97)a (3.97)a (2.28)b (2.61)a (1.45) (1.42)
LOAN DUMMY 35.33 36.92 26.29 32.43 25.89 26.10
(13.59)a (10.57)a (10.00)a (12.22)a (9.87)a (8.14)a
LOAN DUMMY x
LOAN DEFAULT LEADS -2.68 -0.42
(-0.68) (-0.11)
LN(MATURITY) -16.86 -18.37 -18.36
(-5.94)a (-6.75)a (-6.73)a
LN(AMOUNT) -9.17 -4.17 -4.19
(-5.98)a (-2.54)b (-2.54)b
SENIOR SECURED 5.92 9.08 9.00
(1.26) (2.10)c (2.05)c
SENIOR UNSECURED 28.40 22.51 22.50
(7.24)a (5.74)a (5.72)a
SENIOR SUBORDINATED 20.54 20.86 20.72
(6.17)a (6.37)a (5.95)a
Observations 286 286 286 286 286 286
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.41 0.53 0.52 0.60 0.60
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TABLE 12
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-stock pairs around default dates
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-stock pairs surrounding
a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default date of the same company. This
table includes matched loan-stock pairs where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-
model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the return based on a market-model
regression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index for loans, or a value-weighted
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX index for stocks) is subtracted from the loan or stock daily return respectively. The
number of observations is shown for the estimation window [-10,+10]. The t ratios of ACARs are computed
using the methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional
dependence in returns. The t ratios for diﬀerences are based on pair-wise diﬀerence in the ACARs of matched
loan-stock pairs. The t ratios are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Stock ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] 0.21 -30.77 30.98
(0.17) (-5.63)a (3.62)a
[-5,+5 ] -4.87 -32.84 27.97
(-2.08)a (-3.14)a (2.94)a
[-10,+10 ] -13.16 -52.14 38.98
(-4.93)a (-4.04)a (5.08)a
Obs 29 29
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Stock ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -0.38 -17.27 16.89
(-0.76) (-5.40)a (3.87)a
[-5,+5 ] -4.30 -25.39 21.09
(-4.48)a (-4.14)a (4.57)a
[-10,+10 ] -6.38 -44.57 38.19
(-4.76)a (-5.28)a (1.47)
Obs 59 59
40
Appendix 1
Datasets used in this study
This appendix outlines a brief overview of the datasets that we use in this study. We list the providers of
this data, and how the data was processed into individual datasets used in this study.
Loan price dataset
The source for this data is the Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) and Loan Pricing
Corporation (LPC) mark-to-market pricing service, an independent and objective pricing service to more
than 100 institutions, managing almost 175 portfolios with over $200 billion in bank loan assets. This unique
dataset consists of daily bid and ask price quotes aggregated across dealers. Each loan has a minimum of
at least two dealer quotes and a maximum of over 30 dealers, including all top broker-dealers. At the time
we received the dataset from LSTA, there were 33 dealers providing quotes to the LSTA/LPC mark-to-
market pricing service. These price quotes are obtained on a daily basis by LSTA in the late afternoon
from the dealers and the price quotes reﬂect the market events for the day. The data items in this database
include a unique loan identiﬁcation number (LIN), name of the issuer (Company), type of loan, e.g., term
loan (facility), date of pricing (Pricing Date), average of bid quotes (Avg Bid), number of bid quotes (Bid
Quotes), average of second and third highest bid quote (High Bid Avg), average of ask quotes (Avg Ask),
number of ask quotes (Ask Quotes), average of second and third lowest ask quotes (Low Ask Avg), and a
type of classiﬁcation based on the number of quotes received, e.g., Class II if 3 or more bid quotes.
The daily data from 11/1999 thru 06/2002 in the form of individual excel spreadsheets were combined
in SAS based on the unique loan identiﬁcation number (LIN). We excluded loans with a missing LIN since
there is no unique way of combining them, e.g., if a company has three loans, and the LIN is missing on two
of them. We have 543,526 loan-day observations in our loan price data spanning 1,863 loans.
Bond price (Yield Book) dataset
We extracted daily bond prices for the companies for which we have loans in the loan price dataset in
the following manner: First, we found all the available matching Yield Book IDs from the Fixed Income
Securities Database (FISD), namely the 9-digit identiﬁers comprising a 6 digit issuer cusip plus a 3 digit issue
cusip for the bonds pertaining to the companies in the loan price dataset. The matching was done manually
to ensure that we do not miss any bonds due to errors, such as an abbreviated company name in one database
and its full name in another database. Second, we extracted daily prices of the bonds from the Salomon Yield
Book based on their 9-digit identiﬁers. We have a total of 371,797 bond-day observations spanning 816 bonds.
Bond price (Datastream) dataset
We extracted daily bond prices for a subset of loans in the loan price dataset with a loan default date
or a bond default date (the primary focus of this study) in the following manner: First, we found all the
available matching Datastream IDs, namely the 6 digit Datastream codes for the bonds pertaining to the
companies in the loan price dataset. The matching was done manually to ensure that we do not miss any
bonds due to errors, such as an abbreviated company name in one database and its full name in another
database. We check both the current list of Datastream codes of live bonds and the list on the Datastream
Extranet which contains the dead bonds. Second, we extracted daily prices of the bonds from Datastream
based on their 6-digit identiﬁers. We have a total of 91,760 bond-day observations spanning 248 bonds.
Stock price dataset
We extracted daily stock prices and returns for the companies for which we have loans in the loan price
dataset in the following manner: First, we found all the available matching permnos for the stocks pertaining
to the companies in the loan price dataset. The matching was done manually to ensure that we do not miss
any stocks due to errors, such as an abbreviated company name in one database and its full name in another
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database, extra characters in one database as compared to the other. If we could still not ﬁnd a match, we
checked on Hoovers Online, Mergent Online and ﬁnally on Google. If the company is a subsidiary of a larger
company we used the parent companys permno. Second, we extracted daily prices and stocks from the 2002
CRSP stock ﬁles based on the permnos. We have a total of 21,510 stock-day observations spanning 75 stocks
corresponding to a subset of loans in the loan price dataset with a loan default date or a bond default date
(the primary focus of this study).
Loan defaults dataset
The loan defaults dataset consists of loan defaults from the institutional loans market. We received this
data from Portfolio Management Data (PMD), a business unit of Standard & Poors (recently changed its
name to “Standard & Poor’s Leveraged Commentary & Data”) which has been tracking loan defaults in the
institutional loans market since 1995. During our sample period we had 90 loan defaults.
Bond defaults dataset
The source for our bond defaults dataset is the “New York University (NYU) Salomon Center’s Altman
Bond Default Database”. It is a comprehensive dataset of domestic corporate bond default dates starting
from 1974. During our sample period we had 765 bond defaults pertaining to 366 companies.
Loan characteristics dataset
The source for our loan characteristics dataset is the Loan Pricing Corporation. The key data items are:
(a) Name of the borrower, (b) Facility type: information on seniority of a facility, and whether it is a term
loan or revolver facility, (c) Facility amount, (d) Facility date, (e) Final maturity, (f) Security, e.g., Secured
or Unsecured or what type of speciﬁc collateral (All assets, or Capital Stock of Operating Units etc.), (g)
Loan Identiﬁcation Number. We ﬁrst matched the details of the loan from the loan price dataset, e.g., LIN,
name of the borrower, and we created variables that denote the priority structure of a loan, e.g., SENIOR
SECURED, SENIOR UNSECURED, and SENIOR SUBORDINATED (see Section 4.2.2.) based on Facility
type and Security information.
Bond characteristics dataset
The source for our bond defaults dataset is the “New York University (NYU) Salomon Center’s Altman
Bond Default Database”. To measure the priority structure of bonds, we incorporate the seniority and col-
lateral information of a bond, using the classiﬁcation of Altman and Kishore (1996). We classify bonds into
four diﬀerent categories based on the description of a bond in the bond defaults dataset: (a) Senior secured,
(b) Senior unsecured, (c) Senior subordinated, and (d) Subordinated and others.
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Appendix 2
Unadjusted returns of matched loan-bond pairs
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default
date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute the
CAR based on the unadjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the unadjusted loan or
bond daily return respectively. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed using the
methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence
in returns. The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of
matched loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.86 -21.94 17.08
(-5.32)a (-9.51)a (7.90)a
[-5,+5 ] -12.61 -42.25 29.64
(-7.21)a (-9.56)a (6.73)a
[-10,+10 ] -23.92 -55.38 31.46
(-9.91)a (-9.07)a (5.14)a
Obs 74 74
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -4.29 -7.05 2.76
(-4.31)a (-2.72)a (1.09)
[-5,+5 ] -16.23 -35.18 18.95
(-8.52)a (-7.10)a (3.55)a
[-10,+10 ] -25.55 -45.96 20.41
(-9.71)a (-6.71)a (2.58)a
Obs 69 69
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Appendix 3
Mean-adjusted average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default
date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute the
CAR based on the mean adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the average daily return
during a 234 day estimation time period (from day -244 to -11 relative to the default date) is subtracted from
the loan or bond daily return. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed using the
methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence
in returns. The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of
matched loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.54 -20.83 16.29
(-4.99)a (-9.06)a (7.28)a
[-5,+5 ] -11.44 -38.18 26.74
(-6.56)a (-8.67)a (6.14)a
[-10,+10 ] -21.70 -47.62 25.92
(-9.00)a (-7.83)a (4.01)a
Obs 74 74
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -3.88 -5.32 1.44
(-3.91)a (-2.06)b (0.58)
[-5,+5 ] -14.72 -28.83 14.11
(-7.75)a (-5.82)a (2.67)a
[-10,+10 ] -22.67 -33.83 11.16
(-8.64)a (-4.94)a (1.37)
Obs 69 69
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Appendix 4
Market-adjusted average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default
date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute
the CAR based on the market adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the return based
on a market index (such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index for loans, or the Lehman Brothers U.S.
Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted from the loan or bond daily return respectively.
The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed using the methodology of Brown and Warner
(1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in returns. The Z statistics for
the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of matched loan-bond pairs, and
are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a
two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.76 -22.21 17.45
(-5.19)a (-9.42)a (8.14)a
[-5,+5 ] -12.26 -42.79 30.53
(-7.00)a (-9.48)a (6.88)a
[-10,+10 ] -23.78 -56.34 32.56
(-9.82)a (-9.03)a (5.28)a
Obs 74 74
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -4.29 -7.37 3.08
(-4.34)a (-2.84)a (1.21)
[-5,+5 ] -16.24 -36.11 19.87
(-8.57)a (-7.27)a (3.72)a
[-10,+10 ] -25.63 -47.31 21.68
(-9.79)a (-6.89)a (2.72)a
Obs 69 69
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Appendix 5
Three-factor model adjusted average cumulative abnormal returns of loan-bond pairs
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default
date of the same company. This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute the
CAR based on a three-factor model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the return
based on a three-factor model regression (the three factors being the return on the S&P/LSTA Leveraged
Loan Index, the return on the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index, and the return
on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted market index) is subtracted from the loan or bond daily
return respectively. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed using the methodology
of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in returns.
The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of matched
loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Panel A: Loan default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -4.18 -21.52 17.34
(-4.80)a (-9.39)a (8.13)a
[-5,+5 ] -9.10 -38.62 29.52
(-5.46)a (-8.80)a (6.57)a
[-10,+10 ] -18.24 -47.50 29.26
(-7.92)a (-7.83)a (4.53)a
Obs 74 74
Panel B: Bond default dates
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5)
[-1,+1 ] -3.49 -5.58 2.09
(-3.73)a (-2.17)b (0.83)
[-5,+5 ] -12.19 -29.05 16.86
(-6.80)a (-5.91)a (2.99)a
[-10,+10 ] -18.61 -34.07 15.46
(-7.51)a (-5.02)a (1.79)c
Obs 69 69
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Appendix 6
Unadjusted returns of matched loan-bond pairs with the same loan and bond default days
(matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) with the same loan and bond default days (i.e., within 2 days of each other),
surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default date of the same company.
This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute the unadjusted cumulative
returns for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the unadjusted loan or bond daily return respectively. The
Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed using the methodology of Brown and Warner
(1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in returns. The Z statistics for
the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of matched loan-bond pairs, and
are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a
two-tailed test.
Panel A: Unadjusted returns
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -3.04 -2.56 -0.48
(-1.28) (-0.42) (-0.17)
[-5,+5 ] -20.51 -69.87 49.36
(-4.50)a (-6.03)a (4.32)a
[-10,+10 ] -51.25 -82.90 31.65
(-8.15)a (-5.17)a (1.81)c
Obs 26 26
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Appendix 7
Average cumulative abnormal returns of matched loan-bond pairs with the same loan and
bond default days (matched by borrower name)
This table presents the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) of matched loan-bond pairs (based on
the name of the borrower) with the same loan and bond default days (i.e., within 2 days of each other)
surrounding a default date (day 0), namely a loan default date or a bond default date of the same company.
This table includes matched loan-bond pairs where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-
model adjusted method for the [-10,+10] event window. That is, the return based on a market-model
regression using a market index (such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index for loans, or the Lehman
Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is subtracted from the loan or bond daily
return respectively. The Z statistics of ACARs (shown in parentheses) are computed using the methodology
of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in returns.
The Z statistics for the diﬀerence in ACARs are based on a paired diﬀerence test of CARs of matched
loan-bond pairs, and are shown in parentheses, where a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels using a two-tailed test.
Loan ACAR (%) Bond ACAR (%) Diﬀerence in ACAR (%)
Event window (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2)
[-1,+1 ] -0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(-0.57) (-0.06) (-0.34)
[-5,+5 ] -14.66 -60.66 46.00
(-3.30)a (-5.22)a (4.06)a
[-10,+10 ] -41.89 -64.96 23.07
(-6.82)a (-4.04)a (1.31)
Obs 26 26
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Appendix 8
Linear regression of negative cumulative abnormal return of loan-bond pairs with the same
loan and bond default days
This table presents OLS estimates of regression speciﬁcations determining the cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) performance of matched loan-bond pairs (based on the name of the borrower) with the same loan
and bond default days (i.e., within 2 days of each other) surrounding the default date. This table includes
loans, and bonds where we are able to compute the CAR based on the market-model adjusted method for
the [-10,+10] event window. The dependent variable NEGATIVE CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN,
NCAR[-10,+10] equals -CAR[-10,+10], where day [0] refers to a default date, namely the loan default date
or the bond default date of the same company. The CARs are computed based on market-model adjustment,
i.e., the return based on a market-model regression (using a market index such as the S&P/LSTA Leveraged
Loan Index for loans and the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Intermediate Bond Index for bonds) is
subtracted from the loan or bond daily return. The independent variables are as follows: LOAN DUMMY
takes a value of one if it is a loan, and zero otherwise. LN(MATURITY) stands for natural log of one
plus remaining maturity (in years) as on a default date. LN(AMOUNT) stands for natural log of one plus
amount of the loan or bond issue (in $ millions). SENIOR SECURED, SENIORUNSECURED, and SENIOR
SUBORDINATED each take a value of one if a loan or bond is classiﬁed like-wise and zero otherwise. The
t ratios are shown in parentheses (a, b, and c stand for signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using a
two-tailed test).
Dependent Variable: -CAR[-10,+10], Market-model adjusted (%)
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
INTERCEPT 64.96 82.42 167.49 211.88
(4.52)a (0.49) (14.61)a (2.48)b
LOAN DUMMY -23.07 -4.72 -127.31 -124.23
(-1.14) (-0.19) (−11.76)a (-8.67)a
LN(MATURITY) 114.10 14.26
(2.89)a (0.73)
LN(AMOUNT) -39.42 -11.54
(-1.97)b (-1.05)
SENIOR SECURED -180.60 -176.48
(-13.13)a (-12.31)a
SENIOR UNSECURED -54.04 -63.07
(-2.91)a (-3.04)a
SENIOR SUBORDINATED 13.87 7.28
(1.34) (0.63)
Observations 52 52 52 52
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.22 0.83 0.84
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Appendix 9
Recovery rates by debt type and seniority
This table compares three measures of recovery rates, namely trading prices just after default, and 30 days
after default, and at ultimate recovery for the 1988-2Q 2003. The sources are: Altman-NYU Salomon Center
Default database, prices from numerous broker dealers in distressed debt. Bank Loan data from 1996-2002
(for the ﬁrst two measures), and Standard & Poor’s LossStatsTM database from 1988-2Q-2003 for the third
measure (ultimate recoveries discounted at each instrument’s pre-default interest rate). Note that the Sub.
Discounted Bonds category includes zero coupon and discounted bonds of all seniorities.
Debt Type/Seniority Price at Price 30 Days Ultimate recovery
Default After Default Nominal Discounted Annual
#obs. Mean % #obs. Mean % #obs. Mean % Mean % IRR %
Bank Loans 262 69.2 750 58.0 750 88.9 78.8 20.0
Senior Secured Bonds 152 51.6 222 48.8 222 76.5 65.1 20.5
Senior Unsecured Bonds 752 32.4 419 30.3 419 54.9 46.4 23.0
Senior Subordinated Bonds 346 28.8 350 28.4 350 38.2 31.6 7.7
Subordinated Bonds 180 29.0 293 28.9 343 36.3 29.4 8.9
Sub. Discounted Bonds 130 20.4 − − 43 − 22.0 −
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